

2ND BRAZILIAN WORKSHOP OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

in honor of John Nash, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Nash equilibrium

1ST SÃO PAULO SCHOOL OF ADVANCED SCIENCES ON GAME THEORY OF FAPESP

The State of São Paulo Research Foundation

WEDNESDAY – 07/28

14:00 – 17:00	FEA5 - 1 st floor	LATE REGISTRATION PAYMENT
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THURSDAY – 07/29

8:00 – 8:30	FEA5 - 1 st floor	LATE REGISTRATION PAYMENT
8:30 – 9:15	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA5 Auditorium 2)	AUCTIONS Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
9:20– 10:05	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1	NETWORKS Matthew Jackson (Stanford University)
	MINI-COURSE FEA1 Auditorium 2	STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS T.E.S. Raghavan (University of Illinois at Chicago)
10:05 – 10:35	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK
10:35 – 11:20	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1	GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY Steven Brams (New York University)
	MINI-COURSE FEA1 Auditorium 2	EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS John Wooders (University of Arizona)

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

THURSDAY – 07/29

THURSDAY – 07/29						
11:25 – 12:40	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS				
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5	Room 6
Session	APPLICATIONS	COOPERATIVE GAMES	MECHANISM DESIGN	COMPUTATION	LEARNING AND EVOLUTION	MISCELLANEOUS
11:25 – 11:50	Alvaro Riascos Villegas (Universidad de los Andes) <i>Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets</i>	Helga Habis (Maastricht University) <i>Cooperation under incomplete contracting</i>	Rahmil Ilkiliç (Maastricht University) <i>Clearing supply and demand under bilateral constraints</i>	Christos Ioannou (University of Cyprus) <i>Bounded Rationality in Finite Automata</i>	Elvio Accinelli (Facultad de Economía de la UASLP) <i>On the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies in two-population</i>	Markus Kinaterer (Universidad de Navarra) <i>The repeated prisoner's dilemma in a network</i>
11:50 – 12:15		Gianfranco Gambarelli (University of Bergamo) <i>Some open problems in cooperative games</i>	Silvio Micali (MIT) <i>A set-theoretic model of incomplete information and the second-knowledge mechanism</i>	Luis G. Quintas (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) <i>Constructing q-cyclic games with unique prefixed equilibrium</i>	Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera (University of Siena) <i>The evolutionary game of poverty traps</i>	Eran Shmaya (Kellogg School of Management) <i>Pure equilibria in non-anonymous</i>
12:15 – 12:40 session's chair	Min Kim (University of Southern California) <i>Rational bias and herding in analysts' recommendations</i>	Gabriel Turbay (FCI-Universidad del Rosario) <i>N-person cooperative game strategic equilibrium</i>	Leandro Arozamena (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) <i>Fixed points of choice-improving correspondences on the space of direct mechanisms and implementability</i>	Sam Ganzfried (Carnegie Mellon University) <i>Computing equilibria by incorporating qualitative models</i>	Hiroshi Uno (CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain) <i>Hierarchic adaptations</i>	Oscar Volij (Ben Gurion University) <i>An axiomatic characterization of the Theil inequality ordering large games</i>
12:40 – 14:00	LUNCH					

THURSDAY – 07/29

14:00– 14:45	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA5 Auditorium 2)	NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES Shmuel Zamir (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
14:50 – 15:50	FEA5 - 4th floor	COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 1: FAPESP Students Session

THURSDAY – 07/29

15:50 – 16:20	FEA5 Auditorium 1	OPENING CEREMONY OF THE 2ND BWGT 2010
16:25 – 19:25		CELEBRATION OF THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
16:25 – 17:10		Chair: Robert Aumann NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roger Myerson (University of Chicago)
17:15 – 18:00		Chair: Roger Myerson WHERE NASH BARGAINING HAS LED Robert Aumann (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & SUNY at Stony Brook)
18:10 – 18:55		Chair: Marilda Sotomayor CONVERSATION WITH JOHN NASH
18:55 – 19:25		PRESENTATION OF USP CHORUS
20:30 – 23:30		WELCOME RECEPTION

FRIDAY- 07/30

8:30– 10:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES Shmuel Zamir
10:00 – 10:30	FEA 5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK
10:30 – 12:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1	NETWORKS Matthew Jackson
	MINI-COURSE FEA1 Auditorium 2	STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS T.E.S. Raghavan
12:00 – 13:30		LUNCH

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

FRIDAY- 07/30

13:30 – 14:05	SEMI-PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1	Chair: John Duggan THE ROBUSTNESS OF INCOMPLETE CODES OF LAW Olivier Gossner (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics)
	SEMI-PLENARY FEA1 Auditorium 2	Chair: Marina Núñez ENDOGENOUS NETWORK DYNAMICS Frank Page (University of Alabama)
14:05 – 14:40	SEMI-PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1	Chair: Olivier Gossner DYNAMIC POLITICAL AGENCY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD John Duggan (University of Rochester)
	SEMI-PLENARY FEA1 Auditorium 2	Chair: Frank Page VON NEUMANN–MORGENSTERN SOLUTIONS IN THE ASSIGNMENT MARKET Marina Núñez (Universitat de Barcelona)

FRIDAY- 07/30					
14:40 – 15:30	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS			
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5
Session	EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS	INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND MECHANISM DESIGN	AUCTIONS AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS	LEARNING AND EVOLUTION	COOPERATIVE GAMES
14:40 – 15:05	Dorothea Herreiner (Loyola Marymount University) <i>Can we be nice and strategic? Implementing the cooperative-competitive (coco) value in experiments</i>	Carlos Cinquetti (Sao Paulo State University) <i>The effects of trade policy under spatial monopolistic competition</i>	Spyros Galanis (University of Southampton) <i>Admissibility and event-rationality</i>	Fernando Louge (Bielefeld University) <i>On the stability of CSS under the replicator dynamic with strategic complements</i>	Gabriel Turbay (Universidad del Rosario) <i>The stronger player paradox</i>
15:05 – 15:30 session's chair	John Wooders (University of Arizona) <i>An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values</i>	Sergei Severinov (University of British Columbia) <i>Ex-post individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus</i>	Eiichiro Kazumori (SUNY) <i>A strategic theory of markets</i>	Pedro R. Andrade (INPE) <i>Games on cellular spaces</i>	Carles Rafels (Pallarola, University of Barcelona) <i>Assignment markets with the same core</i>

FRIDAY- 07/30

15:30 – 16:10	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 2				
16:10 – 17:00	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS				
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5	Room 6
Session	KNOWLEDGE AND EXPECTATIONS	COOPERATIVE GAMES AND BARGAINING	SOLUTION CONCEPTS	INCOMPLETE INFORMATION	NETWORKS	SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MODELS
16:10 – 16:35	Pedro Daniel Jara-Moroni (Universidad de Santiago de Chile) <i>Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players</i>	Ezio Marchi (Universidad de San Luis) <i>Core contributions in biform games</i>	Noah Stein (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) <i>Exchangeable equilibria of symmetric bimatrix games</i>	Ming Yang (Princeton University) <i>Global games with endogenous information structure – A rational inattention approach</i>	Pritha Dev (ITAM) <i>Choosing ‘me’ and ‘my friends’: Identity in a non-cooperative network formation game with cost sharing</i>	Cristiano Aguiar (UFRGS) <i>Gun control, crime and information</i>
16:35 – 17:00 session’s chair	Pinghan Liang (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) <i>Transfer of authority within hierarchy</i>	Ching-jen Sun (Deakin University) <i>Distributive justice and bargaining solutions</i>	William Geller (Indiana University) <i>Robust equilibria and epsilon-dominance</i>	Bruno Ferreira-Frascaroli (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco) <i>The Brazilian industry and the credit rationing</i>	Matthew Jackson (Stanford University) <i>Network patterns of favor exchange</i>	Micael Ehn (Stockholm University and Malardalen University) <i>Temporal discounting leads to social stratification</i>

FRIDAY- 07/30

17:05 – 17:50	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: Aloísio Araújo THE ALLOCATION OF A PRIZE Pradeep Dubey (SUNY at Stony Brook & Yale University)
17:50–18:35	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: Pradeep Dubey GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, WARINESS AND BUBBLES Aloísio Araújo (EPGE/FGV-RJ & IMPA)

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

SATURDAY – 07/31

8:30– 10:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES Shmuel Zamir
10:00 – 10:30	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK
10:30 – 12:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1	NETWORKS Matthew Jackson
	MINI-COURSE FEA1 Auditorium 2	STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS T.E.S. Raghavan
12:00 – 13:30		LUNCH

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

SATURDAY – 07/31

13:30 – 14:05	SEMI-PLenary FEA5 Auditorium 1	Chair: Paulo Klinger EGALITARIANISM UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION Geoffrey De Clippel (Brown University)
	SEMI-PLenary FEA1 Auditorium 2	Chair: Federico Valenciano REPEATED GAMES WITH BOUNDED MEMORY Hamid Sabourian (Cambridge University)
14:05 – 14:40	SEMI-PLenary FEA5 Auditorium 1	Chair: Geoffrey De Clippel A NEW APPROACH TO RENY'S NASH EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE PROBLEM WITH DISCONTINUOUS PAYOFFS Paulo Klinger (EPGE/FGV-RJ)
	SEMI-PLenary FEA1 Auditorium 2	Chair: Hamid Sabourian QUATERNARY DICHOTOMOUS VOTING RULES Federico Valenciano (Universidad del País Vasco)

SATURDAY – 07/31

SATURDAY – 07/31						
14:45 – 15:35	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS				
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5	Room 6
Session	MATCHING GAME	MECHANISM DESIGN	MISCELLANEOUS	NETWORKS	POLITICAL ECONOMY	BAYESIAN GAMES
14:45 – 15:10	Chiu Yu Ko (Boston College) <i>Profit-maximizing matchmaker</i>	Rann Smorodinsky (Technion) <i>Approximate implementation in large societies</i>	Isabel M. Marques (UCB) <i>A dynamic model of education level choice: Application to Brazilian states</i>	Sunghoon Hong (Vanderbilt University) <i>Strategic network interdiction</i>	Galina Zudenkova (University Carlos III of Madrid) <i>Split-ticket voting: An implicit incentive approach</i>	Eduardo Faingold (Yale University) <i>A characterization of the strategic topology in terms of beliefs</i>
15:10 – 15:35 session's chair	Aytek Erdil (Oxford University) <i>Stochastic assignment</i>	Ilan Lobel (New York University) <i>An optimal dynamic mechanism for multi-armed bandit processes</i>	Paulo Roberto Santos Casaca (Cedeplar/UFGM) <i>Event dependence of ambiguity attitudes</i>	Norma Olaizola (University of the Basque Country) <i>Information, stability and dynamics in networks under institutional constraints</i>	Cesar Martinelli (ITAM) <i>Voting and incentives in cartels</i>	

SATURDAY – 07/31

15:30 – 16:10	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 3				
	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS				
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5	Room 6
Session	AUCTIONS	BARGAINING	COOPERATIVE GAMES	INCOMPLETE INFORMATION	LEARNING AND EVOLUTION	MARKET GAMES AND APPLICATIONS
16:10 – 16:35	Sergio Parreiras (University of North Carolina) <i>A dynamic all-pay auction</i>	Ekaterina Demidova (HHL-Leipzig Graduate School of Management) <i>Group bargaining with incomplete information</i>	Ilya Katsev (S-Pb Institute for Economics and Mathematics) <i>The Shapley value for games with restricted cooperation</i>	Shrutivandana Sharma (Yahoo! Labs) <i>Resource allocation in local public good networks: An implementation theory perspective</i>	Ryota Iijima (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo) <i>Impact of matching uncertainty on dynamic stability of equilibria</i>	Vladimir Mazalov (Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Russia) <i>Hotelling's duopoly on the plane with Manhattan distance</i>
16:35 – 17:00 session's chair	Fernando Meneguín (Brazilian Senate) <i>Auctions for court-ordered debt payments in Brazil</i>	Selçuk Ozyurt (Sabancı University) <i>Searching a bargain: Play it cool or haggle</i>	Ehud Lehrer (Tel Aviv University) <i>On the core of dynamic cooperative games</i>	Telmo José João (Universidade de Aveiro) <i>Hotelling model with uncertainty on the production cost and networks</i>	Lucas Lages Wardil (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais) <i>Distinguishing the opponents: Mutual cooperation is never destroyed</i>	Helena I. Ferreira (Universidade do Minho) <i>Bayesian-Nash equilibria in a behavior model</i>

SATURDAY – 07/31

17:00 – 17:45	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: Myrna Wooders ON THE EXISTENCE OF MONOTONE PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN BAYESIAN GAMES Philip Reny (University of Chicago)
17:45–18:30	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: Philip Reny NETWORKS OF PLUNDERERS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES Myrna Wooders (University of Vanderbilt)

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

SUNDAY – 08/01

8:30– 10:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA5 Auditorium 2)	NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES Shmuel Zamir
10:00 – 10:30	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK
10:30 – 12:00	MINI-COURSE	NETWORKS Matthew Jackson
	MINI-COURSE	STOCHASTIC GAMES: ALGORITHMS AND EXISTENCE THEOREMS T.E.S. Raghavan
13:30 – 20:00	Xangrilá Country House (Bus)	BARBECUE AND FORRÓ

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

MONDAY – 08/02

8:30– 10:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	AUCTIONS Paul Milgrom
10:00 – 10:30	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 4
10:30 – 12:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1	GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY Steven Brams
	MINI-COURSE FEA1 Auditorium 2	EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS John Wooders
12:00 – 13:30		LUNCH

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

MONDAY – 08/02

13:30 – 14:15	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: Robert Aumann .ELECTIONS AND STRATEGIC VOTING: CONDORCET AND BORDA. Eric Maskin (Princeton University)
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*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

MONDAY – 08/02				
14:20 – 15:35	FEA 1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS		
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Session	APPLICATIONS	INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION	POLITICAL ECONOMY	COALITION FORMATION
14:20 – 14:45	Min Kim (University of Southern California) <i>Information asymmetry and incentives for active management</i>	Rafael P. S. Morais (Fundação Getulio Vargas) <i>Regulation of pharmaceuticals after generics entry</i>	Adriana Portugal (TCDF) <i>Public and private financing of electoral campaigns: The social welfare effect of political participation</i>	Haruo Imai (Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University) <i>Emergence of nested coalition structure in a pure bargaining game</i>
14:45 – 15:10	Daniel Figueiredo (COPPE/UFRJ) <i>A simple public good model for peer-to-peer applications</i>	Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos (Federal University of Juiz de Fora) <i>The effectiveness of the Brazilian leniency program: A game theoretical analysis</i>	Rafael Lima (University of São Paulo) <i>Information transmission and inefficient lobbying</i>	Marcelo Alves Pereira (Universidade de Sao Paulo) <i>Continuous prisoner's dilemma With rational players</i>
15:10 – 15:35 session's chair	Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado (Catholic University of Brasilia) <i>Impacts of the changes in the Brazilian mobile termination rates</i>	Fernando de Almeida Prado (FFCLRP - USP) <i>Product differentiation in the presence of social interactions of consumers</i>	Rodrigo Moita (Insper Institute) <i>Political price cycles in regulated industries: Theory and evidence</i>	

MONDAY – 08/02

15:35 – 16:05	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK				
16:05 – 16:55	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS				
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5	Room 6
Session	REPUTATION	REPEATED GAMES	LEARNING AND EVOLUTION	EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND REPEATED GAMES	MECHANISM DESIGN	MATCHING GAME
16:05 – 16:30	In-Uck Park (University of Bristol) <i>Seller reputation and trust in pre-trade communication</i>	Miguel Aramendia (Universidad del Pais Vasco) <i>Long-run forgiving proof equilibrium in infinitely repeated games</i>	Matthias Hanauske (Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main) <i>Evolutionary quantum game theory and scientific communication</i>	Adam Zylbersztein (University Paris 1, PSE) <i>Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information</i>	Aaron Bodoh-Creed (Stanford University) <i>The simple behavior of large mechanisms</i>	Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University) <i>Coalitional matchings</i>
16:30 – 16:55 session's chair	Felipe Zurita (PUC/Chile) <i>On reputational rents as an incentive mechanism in competitive markets</i>	Ichiro Obara (UCLA) <i>Belief-based equilibria</i>	Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern University) <i>Near-optimal Pricing for products with social learning effects</i>	Antonio Miguel Osório-Costa (Universidad Carlos III Madrid) <i>Repeated games at random moments in time</i>	Jing Chen (MIT) <i>Safe rationalizability and mechanism design</i>	Hanna Halaburda (Harvard Business School) <i>Platforms and limits to network effects</i>

MONDAY – 08/02

17:00 – 17:45	PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: John Nash GAME THEORY SOCIETY PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIA Sergiu Hart (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
17:45 – 18:30	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: Sergiu Hart THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES John Nash (Princeton University)
19:30 – 23:00	Espaço Rosa Rosarum (Bus)	GALA DINNER (SPONSORED BY ORDER OF ECONOMISTS OF BRAZIL - OEB)

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

TUESDAY – 08/03

8:30 – 10:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	AUCTIONS Paul Milgrom
10:00 – 10:30	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK
10:30 – 12:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1	GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY Steven Brams
	MINI-COURSE FEA1 Auditorium 2	EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS John Wooders
12:00 – 13:30		LUNCH
13:30 – 14:15	FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: Myrna Wooders ROUND TABLE – Game Theory: 60 years after Nash equilibrium

LS*: Live Streaming (IP TV)

TUESDAY – 08/03				
14:20 – 15:35	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS		
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Session	AUCTIONS	INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION	VOTING AND POLITICAL ECONOMY	NETWORKS
14:20 – 14:45	Rodrigo Harrison (Instituto de Economía PUC Chile) <i>Auctions with resale market and asymmetric information</i>	Debdatta Saha (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre) <i>Does the market kill bad ideas? An institutional comparison of committees and markets in network industries</i>	Renata Rizzi (Universidade de São Paulo) <i>Campaign contributions as a compulsory toll: pay-to-play evidence from Brazil</i>	Britta Hoyer (Utrecht University School of Economics) <i>Strategic network disruption</i>
14:45 – 15:10	Federico Weinschelbaum (Universidad de San Andrés) <i>On favoritism in auctions with entry</i>	Ming Gao (London Business School) <i>When to allow buyers to sell? Bundling in mixed two-sided markets</i>	Eduardo Perez (Ecole Polytechnique) <i>Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues</i>	Juan Escobar (CEA-DII University of Chile) <i>Cooperation and trust in social networks of information transmission</i>
15:10 – 15:35 session's chair	Eric U. Brasil (IPE-USP) <i>Informational rents in the Brazilian oil and gas auctions</i>	Pedro Daniel Jara-Moroni (Universidad de Santiago de Chile) <i>A two-stage model of R&D with endogenous timing in quantity competition</i>	Galina Zudenkova (University Carlos III of Madrid) <i>Sincere lobbying formation</i>	Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University) <i>How to connect under incomplete information</i>

TUESDAY – 08/03

15:35 – 16:05	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK				
16:05 – 16:55	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS				
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5	Room 6
Session	FAIRNESS AND IMPLEMENTATION	MECHANISM DESIGN	DIFFERENTIAL GAMES AND FINANCE	REPEATED GAMES	POLITICAL ECONOMY	INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
16:05 – 16:30	Steven Brams (New York University) <i>The undercut procedure: An algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items</i>	Vinicius Carrasco (PUC-Rio) <i>From equals to despots: The dynamics of repeated decision taking in partnerships with private information</i>	João José de Farias Neto (Instituto de Estudos Avançados – CTA) <i>A 3D missile-airplane pursuit-evasion differential game</i>	Antonio Miguel Osório-Costa (Universidad Carlos III Madrid) <i>Repeated interaction and the revelation of player's type: A principal-monitor-agent problem</i>	Carlos Pereira (FGV/SP and Michigan State University) <i>Accountability Behind Closed Doors? Legislator Power and Voting Procedures</i>	Ron Siegel (Northwestern University) <i>Head starts in all-pay contests</i>
16:30 – 16:55 session's chair	Pelin Pasin Cowley (Bilkent University) <i>Strong Nash implementability via critical profiles</i>	Marcelo Griebeler (IMPA) <i>General envelope theorem for multidimensional type spaces</i>	Adriano Campos Menezes (Catholic University of Brasilia) <i>Credit derivative in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets</i>	Matthias Blonsky (J.W. Goethe University) <i>Equilibrium selection in the repeated prisoner's dilemma: Axiomatic approach and experimental evidence</i>	Matteo Triossi (Universidad de Chile) <i>Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?</i>	Eray Cumbul (University of Rochester) <i>An algorithmic approach to find iterated Nash equilibria</i>

TUESDAY – 08/03

17:00 – 17:45	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: Gabrielle Demange ON THE VULNERABILITY OF ALLOCATION RULES TO MANIPULATION OF ENDOWMENTS William Thomson (University of Rochester)
17:45 – 18:30	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	Chair: William Thomson COLLECTIVE ATTENTION AND RANKING METHODS Gabrielle Demange (PSE-EHESS)
19:00 – 23:00	FEA5 - 4 th floor	CLOSING RECEPTION

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

WEDNESDAY – 08/04

8:30– 10:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	AUCTIONS Paul Milgrom
10:00 – 10:30	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK
10:30 – 12:00	MINI-COURSE FEA5 Auditorium 1	GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRACY Steven Brams
	MINI-COURSE FEA1 Auditorium 2	EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS John Wooders
12:00 – 13:30		LUNCH

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

WEDNESDAY – 08/04

13:30 – 14:05	SEMI-PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1	Chair: William H. Sandholm RATIONALIZATION Alvaro Sandroni (University of Pennsylvania)
	SEMI-PLENARY FEA1 Auditorium 2	Chair: Olivier Hudry IS THE DEMAND PROFILE APPROACH OPTIMAL? Humberto Moreira (EPGE/FGV-RJ)
14:05 – 14:40	SEMI-PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1	Chair: Alvaro Sandroni EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY: OVERVIEW AND RECENT RESULTS William H. Sandholm (University of Wisconsin)
	SEMI-PLENARY FEA1 Auditorium 2	Chair: Humberto Moreira HOW DIFFICULT IS IT TO COMPUTE THE WINNER OF A GAME? Olivier Hudry (Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications)

WEDNESDAY – 08/04

REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS						
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5	Room 6
Session	MATCHING GAME	SOLUTION CONCEPTS	STOCHASTIC GAMES AND FINANCE	POLITICAL ECONOMY	BOUNDED RATIONALITY	SOCIAL CHOICE
14:40 – 15:05	Yosuke Yasuda (GRIPS) <i>Understanding stable matchings: A non-cooperative Approach</i>	Filipe Costa de Souza (UFPE) <i>Mixed equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational</i>	Nagarajan Krishnamurthy (Chennai Mathematical Institute) <i>New classes of two-player and multi-player stochastic games with the Orderfield property</i>	Wolfgang Leininger (University of Dortmund) <i>Leveling the lobbying process: Effort maximization in asymmetric n-person contests</i>	Daniel Monte (Simon Fraser University) <i>Learning in hidden Markov models with bounded memory</i>	Alejandro Neme (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis) <i>The division problem with voluntary participation</i>
15:05 – 15:30 session's chair	Eduardo Azevedo (Harvard University) <i>Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets</i>	Paulo Barelli (University of Rochester and Insper) <i>On the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous and qualitative games</i>	Jaime Orillo (Catholic University of Brasilia) <i>Dissaving of the past: the case of the reverse mortgage</i>	Ayse Mumcu (Bogazici University) <i>Informality as a self-fulfilling equilibrium</i>	Aaron Bodoh-Creed (Stanford University) <i>Mood, associative memory, and the formation and dynamics of belief</i>	Alan Miller (University of Haifa) <i>Rules for aggregating information</i>

WEDNESDAY – 08/04

WEDNESDAY – 08/04						
15:30 – 16:00	FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK				
16:00 – 16:50	FEA1 - 1 st floor	REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS				
Room	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4	Room 5	Room 6
Session	INCOMPLETE INFORMATION	COOPERATIVE GAMES	MATCHING GAME	CONTRACTS	REFINEMENT AND SEARCH	MATCHING GAMES
16:00 – 16:25	Andreas Blume (University of Pittsburgh) <i>Language barriers</i>	Rene Levinsky (Max Planck Institute of Economics) <i>On the axiomatisation of the balanced solution for cooperative TU-games</i>	Jacob Leshno (Harvard University) <i>Can we make school choice more efficient? An incentives approach</i>	David Ong (Peking University HSBC School of Business) <i>Fishy gifts: Bribing with shame and guilt</i>	Leandro Chaves Rêgo (Federal University of Pernambuco) <i>Collaborative dominance: When doing unto others as you would have them do unto you is rational</i>	Mustafa Oguz Afacan (Stanford University) <i>Group robust stability in matching markets</i>
16:25 – 16:50 session's chair	Rafael Chaves Santos (BCB, IBMEC/BSB) <i>Inflation targeting, coordination and confidence crises</i>	Francisco Sanchez (CIMAT) <i>The value of partners</i>	Roland Pongou (Brown University) <i>An economic theory of fidelity in network formation</i>	Roberta Ribeiro Fernandes (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco) <i>Principal-multiagent model with moral hazard from a behavioral economics perspective</i>	Dmitrijs Rutko (University of Latvia) <i>Fuzzified algorithm for game tree search</i>	Jorge Oviedo (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis) <i>On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles</i>

WEDNESDAY – 08/04

16:55 – 17:40	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	<p style="text-align: center;">Chair: Abraham Neyman DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION Motty Perry (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & The University of Warwick)</p>
17:40 – 18:25	PLENARY FEA5 Auditorium 1 (LS* FEA1 Auditorium 2)	<p style="text-align: center;">Chair: Motty Perry A NEW DEFINITION OF DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES AND STATIONARY PAYOFFS AND EQUILIBRIUM Abraham Neyman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)</p>

*LS: Live Streaming (IP TV)

FRIDAY- 07/30

15:30 – 16:00 FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 2	
Name	Institution	Title of Presentation
Abdelrahim Mousa	University of Minho	<i>Pinto's individuals decision bussola</i>
Akira Yokotani	University of Rochester	<i>Universal-Bayesian approach to robust implementation</i>
Artus Philipp Rosenbusch	TU Darmstadt	<i>Fairness as a point-of-view</i>
Christoph Schottmüller	Tilburg University	<i>Procurement, liberalization and specialization</i>
João José de Farias Neto	Instituto de Estudos Avançados CTA	<i>Quantum battle of the sexes revisited</i>
Erkan Yalcin	University of New England	<i>Corruption and political competition</i>
Fernando Teles	Universidade Federal de São João del-Rei	<i>Human interactivity and prisoner's dilemma: Building a computer simulation for the studies of cooperation</i>
Gerson D S Damiani	USP	<i>Two-level game theory In contemporary international relations: Is the introduction of A third dimension in order?</i>
Gustavo De Oliveira Aggio	Unicamp	<i>Emergence of social conventions: An approach based on decentralized interactions of individuals with propensity to imitate</i>

SATURDAY – 07/31

15:30 – 16:00 FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 3	
Name	Institution	Title of Presentation
José Luciano Santiago Arroyo Mina	Pontificia Universidad Javeriana	<i>Economy of the crime and theory of games: A theoretical model of the direct exchange of illegal drugs on a small scale</i>
Joss Erick Sánchez Pérez	Facultad de Economía, UASLP	<i>Characterization of linear symmetric solutions for games in partition function form</i>
Luciana Torrezan Silveira	Esaq/USP	<i>Application of game theory to the decision on prevention against foot-and-mouth disease in Brazil</i>
Luciano Sampaio	UFRN	<i>Entry of branded and unbranded gas stations in Brazilian local markets</i>
Luis Alejandro Palacio García	University of Granada	<i>Never retreat, never surrender: The bargaining power of commitment in the hawk- dove game</i>
Luís Miguel M. da Silva Ferreira	University of Minho	<i>R&D dynamics on costs</i>
Miguel Andres Espinosa Farfan	Universidad de los Andes	<i>A generalized model for multiple principals and multiple agents with moral hazard</i>

MONDAY – 08/02

15:35 – 16:05 FEA5 - 4 th floor	COFFEE BREAK & POSTER SESSION 4	
Name	Institution	Title of Presentation
Nagarajan Krishnamurthy	Chennai Mathematical Institute	<i>On solving classes of stochastic games via linear complementarity formulations</i>
Neantro Saavedra-Rivano	CERME/University of Brasilia	<i>Development and Financing of Human Capital</i>
Patrick Cesar Alves Terrematte	UFRN/DIMAp/PPGSC	<i>Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games and how To play with structures</i>
Paul Varkey	University of Illinois at Chicago	<i>Bargaining under higher order uncertainty: Perfect Bayesian equilibria with sensitivity analysis</i>
Pierfrancesco La Mura	HHL - Leipzig Graduate School of Management	<i>Game theory without decision-theoretic paradoxes</i>
Silvio Micali	MIT	<i>Efficient combinatorial exchanges with complete information</i>
Sonali Sen Gupta	University of Birmingham	<i>Correlation in an emission game</i>
Stelian Stancu	Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest	<i>Perfect Bayesian equilibrium as for the signalling games on the labour force market of EU-27</i>
Tristan Barnett	Victoria University	<i>Applying risk theory to game theory</i>

FAPESP - The State of São Paulo Research Foundation
1st São Paulo School of Advanced Sciences on Game Theory
LIST OF SELECTED STUDENTS

Name	Institution
Aaron Bodoh-Creed	Stanford University, Economics Dept
Abdelrahim Mousa	Universidade de Aveiro
Adam Zylbersztein	University Paris 1, Paris School of Economics
Agustin German Bonifacio	Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis – UNSL
Akira Aricê de M. G. Uematsu	IME-USP
Akira Yokotani	University of Rochester
Alan D. Miller	University of Haifa
Alejandro Barrachina Monfort	University of Valencia (ERI-CES)
Alessandro R. de C. Casalecchi	IPE-USP
Alexandra Cortés Aguilar	University of Granada
Alper Nakkas	Vanderbilt University
Ana Cláudia Sant'Anna	USP – ESALQ
Anderson Portugal Cardoso	USP
André Costa e Silva Rincon	FEA-RP - Universidade de São Paulo
Andrea Lucchesi	FEA USP
Antonio Miguel Osorio-Costa	Universidad Carlos III Madrid
Artus Philipp Rosenbusch	TU Darmstadt
Atol Fortin De Oliveira	IME-USP
Beatrice Aline Zimmermann	
Bethania De Alencar Gama Lyra	IPE-USP
Breno de Castro Vieira	PUC-Rio
Britta Hoyer	Utrecht University School of Economics
Carlos Hugo Mendiburu Diaz	Universidad de San Andrés
Ceren G. Yilmaz	Stony Brook University
Chiu Yu Ko	Boston College
Christoph Schottmüller	Tilburg University
Cristian Andres Cruz Torres	IMPA
Dejanir Henrique Silva	FEA/USP
Denise Imori	IPE – USP
Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera	University of Siena
Eliana Beatriz Pepa Risma	Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (UNSL)
Ekaterina Demidova	HHL-Leipzig Graduate School of Management

Erik Eduardo Rego	
Fernando Fonseca	USP
Galina Zudenkova	University Carlos III of Madrid
Gerson D S Damiani	USP
Guilherme F. de Avila Monteiro	USP
Guilherme Sabóia Sandri	PUCRS
Heitor Sandes Pellegrina	USP
Helena Cristina Dill	
Helena I. dos S. Ribeiro Ferreira	University of Minho
Ibrahim Baris Esmerok	Rice University
Ilya Katsev	S-Pb Institute for Economics and Mathematics
Jhonata Emerick Ramos	IMPA
Jing Chen	MIT
João Pedro Jericó De Andrade	Instituto de Física da USP
Juan Pablo Gama Torres	IMPA
Lauren Nicole Merrill	Harvard University Department of Economics
Leandro Garcia Meyer	
Luca Paolo Merlino	ECARES
Lucas Campos Pahl	IMPA
Lucas Lages Wardil	Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Lucia Maria Chiappara	UBA
Luciana Beatriz Pepa Risma	Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis
Luis Alejandro Palacio García	University of Granada
Marcel Zimmermann Aranha	FEA/USP
Marcelo Ariel Fernández	Universidad de San Andres
Marcelo Griebeler	IMPA
Mariana Fialho Ferreira	Universidade de Brasilia – UnB
Mariana Orsini M. de Sousa	IPE-USP
Marina Vessio Dessotti	USP-RP
Marta Maria Casetti	London School of Economics
Matthew Bourque	University of Illinois-Chicago
Mauricio Mesquita Bortoluzzo	USP
Maximiliano Barbosa Da Silva	Universidade de São Paulo
Michel Cantagalo	USP
Miguel Andres Espinosa Farfan	Universidad de los Andes
Ming Gao	London Business School
Nan Li	IDEA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Nagarajan Krishnamurthy	Chennai Mathematical Institute
Natalia Dus Poiatti	London Business School
Nayara Peneda Tozei	Universidade Federal de Viçosa
Nikhil Agarwal	Harvard University
Patrick Wohrle Guimaraes	UFMT/FE-IF
Paul Varkey	University of Illinois at Chicago
Paula Carvalho Pereda	IPE-FEA-USP
Paula Sarita Bigio Schnaider	FEA/USP
Pavel Coronado Castellanos	PUC-RIO
Pedro R. Andrade	INPE
Pinghan Liang	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Radoslav Raykov	Boston College
Rafael Crivellari Saliba Schouery	IME-USP
Rafael Afonso Monastier	
Raphael Corbi	London Business School
Raquel Silvestrin Zanon	FEA/USP
Raul Ramos Timponi	The Federal University of Rio de Janeiro/Economics
Renato Vicente	USP
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Rodolpho Talaisys Bernabel	USP
Rodrigo Rodrigues Adão	PUC-Rio
Roland Pongou	Brown University
Ruben Juarez	University of Hawaii
Sam Ganzfried	Carnegie Mellon University
Sarah Bretones	FEA-USP
Sebastian Cea	Universidad de Chile
Selçuk Ozyurt	Sabancı University
Sonali Sen Gupta	University of Birmingham
Sunghoon Hong	Vanderbilt University
Tatiana de Macedo Nogueira Lima	Universidade de São Paulo
Telmo José João Parreira	Universidade de Aveiro
Thomaz Mingatos F. Gemignani	FEA-USP
Umberto Mignozzetti	University of São Paulo
Urme Khan	University of Texas, Austin
Vanderson Amadeu Da Rocha	FEA-RP USP
Veridiana Ramos	FEA-USP

Victor Westrupp	IPE FEA USP
Yilei Hu	University of Oxford